Film Philosophy, 10.2 September, 2006 characterized by the belief that the dead return to haunt the living, Mulvey links the fantasy cinema of Méliès and the realism of the Lumière brothers. The Lumière's supposed realism currently takes on the aspect of a ghostly uncanny whose phantom-like quality parallels the magic and marvellous effects of Méliès's theatrical illusions with both types of production taking on an air of 'intellectual uncertainty' in relation to the human body. Mulvey extends this mode of linking disparate protagonists from film theory and history in a following chapter where she brings André Bazin and Roland Barthes together to explore the index in relation to the uncanny. For both the structuralist and the realist/humanist, the photographic index is a trace that, while signifying death, also has a purchase on the future. Barthes's 'this was now' (57) and Bazin's time embalmed are conceptions of the photograph as record of the past reaching towards the future, an instance of the past becoming present in another temporality. But for Barthes this is a 'terrible…return of the dead' (60), much like Freud's ghostly uncanny, whereas Bazin's Catholicism permits him to see embalming as a way of seizing life from death. For Barthes, the moment of 'intellectual uncertainty' instigated by the photograph, the punctum, is tinged with the melancholy realisation of his own extinction. Although Mulvey does not explicitly mention this, her dialectical reading produces Barthes as the humanist who cannot come to terms with his own extinction, the elimination of 'an I' triggered by the uncanny presence of the photograph (63). Barthes holds fast to the moment of the punctum. While this moment overwhelms the subject, the realisation of its poignancy or pain is a sign that one is not yet, or not quite, eliminated. This is why Barthes dislikes cinema, or to be more precise, film.
1 The moving image cannot be seized as such. It subjects the subject to its horizontal time frame, making it impossible for the fetishist to control the image.
Curiously, Mulvey's thesis in Death 24x a Second, whereby the viewer can now subject cinematic time to delay, resurrects fetishism as a new and radical mode of spectatorship. This is somewhat puzzling given the proximity of fetishism and voyeurism in Mulvey's earlier 1975 essay where she performed a critique of both. In 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema', Mulvey contrasted the films of Joseph von Sternberg to Hitchcock, using the former to illustrate fetishistic scopophilia, the latter, voyeurism. While the former exists outside linear time with the erotic instinct focused on the look alone, the latter depends on sadistic control. However, they are both ways of dealing with castration anxiety and, albeit differently, they are in fact both However, while at 24 frames a second we might not register the black extras that pass by in the Coney Island sequence, does Mulvey's conclusion really add anything that is not already inscribed in the film's narrative or that is not gleaned from academic film analysis, which has always relied on stills? The only advantage seems to be that now we can all do the latter kind of film analysis at home, but while this may be democratic in principle, it destroys the essence of film, which is movement.
The reduction of film to a series of stills for the purpose of interpretation has often been regretted by many proponents of classical film analysis. For me, the reassertion of fetishistic spectatorship in Death 24x a Second is disappointing and may even be hiding an underlying radicalism embedded in Mulvey's thesis.
In her claim that spectatorship is feminized in the fetishistic control of the stilled image, Mulvey somewhat resurrects the thesis that femininity and fetishism are not mutually exclusive. Freud designated fetishism as a male preserve and in the 1980s artists and film theorists such as Mary Kelly and Mary Ann Doane respectively wanted to recover fetishism for female agency and pleasure. This is old hat. The parameters of debates have shifted. Whether due to the impact of digital technology or to a wider configuration of factors, immersive spectatorship is not seen as the bugbear it was in the 1970s and 1980s. Critical distance, which is preserved in fetishism, is no longer seen as the sine qua non of our engagement with images and instead discussions around haptical tactility and mimetic identification have It is this blind field that Barthes's fetishistic attention on the still seeks to eradicate but it returns, not simply to haunt the subject, but to take him elsewhere.
When Barthes claims that the still flouts logical time, whereas cinema is linear, the flouting of logical time that the punctum in the still engenders mirrors the very structure of the moving image (Barthes, 1989b: 61) . Mulvey is sensitive to this contradiction, but her claim that the freezing of the image that the spectator can enact due to digital technology enables a fetishistic control that is different from previous modes of spectatorship is unconvincing. The fetishistic freezing of the image in the digital and the fetishistic freezing of 'the look' that Mulvey regaled against in 1975 seem to me to be companionable bedfellows that span a thirty year horizon.
But in the same way that Barthes can be read against himself, there are aspects of Mulvey's thesis that make inroads into new models of spectatorship.
Returning to 'Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema', I have always been struck by how Mulvey's claims for the close-up of the female image exceed the psychoanalytic framework she adopts in that essay. The fact that the 'representation of the female image threatens to break the spell of illusion, and the erotic image on the screen appears directly (without mediation) to the spectator' is to my mind what needs to be remembered here (Mulvey, 1984: 373) . While fetishism is one route or reaction to this, what is also ushered in here is the potential to immerse oneself in an image, which exceeds the terms of control, either of or by the image. In the interrelation between the stilled, yet diegetic, image and the spectator, who is also both still and moving, a disjunctive engagement between the parameters of stillness and movement occurs, generating associations and emotions that are not predicated on content. feminized Valentino as object of the look, for her concept of delayed cinema. But this seems incongruous as Hansen is not talking about the control associated with fetishism here but a look which 'is one of reciprocity and ambivalence' (169) and cuts 'across visual and narrative registers' (170). The framing of this feminized look tends towards incompleteness and interchangeability between positions on and off screen, whereas in Mulvey's delayed image, the shot is subject to a totalizing control whereby all details are legible. While the appearance of the still in the moving image via the freeze frame may logically elicit the fetishistic control that Mulvey describes, I
would say that in her adherence to psychoanalytic terms, Mulvey seems to have forgotten the unconscious. The potentially possessive spectator may just as easily be possessed by the emergent stillness. Our relation to images is ultimately unpredictable and, while being predicated on technological forms, is not reducible to them. Technological control of the still image can just as easily prompt an overwhelming of the spectator that moves them in a masochistic direction rather than allowing for the establishment of sadistic control. The quiescence of the freeze frame is never still in the sense that, as Barthes found in his attempt to still the image, it elicits a gaze that is open to a temporality not just of the past, but also to the ambiguity of the future. The index is never a silent memento of that past but is always being animated by the gaze that looks upon it, an animation that in turn unseats the possessive spectator from sadistic mastery. Mulvey hints as much when she discusses the reminder of mortality that ensues in the still images of Hollywood stars now dead, their animation preserved or mummified in celluloid, but again, this fetishizes the index. Mulvey resurrects fetishism to protect against the ephemeral nature of cinematic experience. 'Since the cinematic experience is so ephemeral, it has always been difficult to hold on to its precious moments, images and, most particularly, its idols' (161). However, cinematic experience could be said to be comprised of nothing but remembered and misremembered precious moments. As
Stanley Cavell points out in The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film, 'certain moments from films viewed decades ago will nag as vividly as moments of childhood ' (1979: 17) . Regardless of whether the image is stilled right in front of you or not, there is something about the interaction between the cinematic image and the stillness in Barthes, see Peter Brunette and David Wills (1989, 111 
